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THE  INTEGRATION  Of  THE  COMMUNITY  IN  TI!E  FACE 
OF  ENLJ\llGa1ENT 
This  evening  1  should  like to talk to you  about 
a  ~rincipal issue  that  now  faces  the  Community  :  how 
and  why  \ve  ihould  resume  our  T:JUrsui t  of monetary  union 
and  economic  integration at  the  same  time  as  we  face  a 
second  enlargement  of the  Community. 
The  ap~licRtions for  membershi~ of the  Community 
from  Greece,  Portugal  and Spain  have  rightly been 
welcomed.  Despite  the  f~ct  th~t the  last  enlargement 
took place only  four  years  ago,  and  in  some  res~ects 
was  only  formally  completed this year '\·lith  the  end  of 
the  transitional  periods,  the  Community  should  embrace 
this prospect  of  enlargement  t~the South.  The 
reasons  are  simple  and  primarily politicRl.  First, 
the  Community  was  foundccl  in the  dnty to cherish 
and  nurture parliamentary democracy  and  individual 
liberty.  Whatever  our other difficulties,  these 
remain  our  entrenched values.  The  recent  emergence 
I  of  nc1-1 ---------- ,._., __  . 
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dcmocrntic  rer,imcs  in  the  three  ::~nplicnnt  nat:tc~s 
calls  for  a  direct anJ  full-hearted  rcs!1onse  fr01n 
the  Community.  To  fail to  give  svch  a  response 
'vould ·run the  risk ·of undermining  the very democracy 
for  which  we  stand.  The  nolitical attraction of 
ap9lication underwrites  our  fundamental  political 
purpose. 
Second,  Nhat~ver ·ou_r  economic  difficulties 
or  lack of  internal  integration,  we  must  be  open  to 
demoCTatic  European  states who  are  anxious  and  qualified 
to  join.  It is much  better that there  are  those  who 
want  to  apply  rather  than  t~~~e  ar~ those  who  wish  to 
leave. 
But,  des9ite  our  overall political aims,  the 
'  central  thrust  of the  Community  remains.· economic,  and 
there  is  no  doubt  that the  combined  weight  of the 
three  applicants would  add  to what  I  would  describe 
as  the  'poor-end'  loadihg of the  Community.  Naturally 
there  are  important  differences  between  the  three 
countries  concerned.  The  Greek  and  Snanish  economies, 
and  standards  of  living,  are  generally little 
different  from  those  of  Ireland or  Southern  Italy. 
The·  economic  situation of  Port~gai is qualitatively 
and  quantatively of  a  different  order.  But  the  overall  . . 
net  effect 'vill  add to  the  Community's  economic  nroblems. 
The  pessimistic reaction  in these  circumstances 
would  be  to  accept  the political inevitability of 
enlargement  and  an  accompanying  \veakening  and  dilutio"n 
I  of existing - ~-----~~~-~-~------------~---------------------------
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of cxisti ng  Community  intcgratio11.  I  believe 
this  approach to be  profoundly mistaken.  It is 
politically inconsistent with the  Community's  aims, 
and  it-is,in my-view,  based  on  a  false analysis  of 
the  options  onen  to us.  I  would  also  add that it 
is the  last thing  the  ap~licants themselves  want. 
Why  should  they  go  to the trouble  and  take  the 
political risk of resigning  from  one  free  trade 
area,  E.F.T.A.,  only to  find-that  at  the  end  of the 
•  day  they have,  by  doing  so,  joined another lvhich  has 
slipped back  to  a  simnle  common  ma.rket  ? 
But  it is not  only  a  pr.oblem  for  tho  applicant 
countries  themselves,.or  just a  question of enlargement. 
The  existing  Community,  in  any  event,  has  to  face  up  to 
its more  pressing  economic  problems ,1  and  that is why 
.  '  , 
the  Commission  has  decided  to  give  a  new~ more  urgent 
and  contemnorarv  impulse  to  the  old  idea of  economic  ..  , .  . .. 
and  monetary union,  particularly its monetary  aspect. 
First,  I  should  like_to  outline what,  in my  view,  . 
are  the.seven basic reasons  for  pursuing monetary  union 
today~  I  will only  summarise  these  arguments,  since  I 
have  already set  them  out  in  some  detail  in my  Jean 
Monnet  Lecture  in Florence  in October.  ·But I  shall 
follow this  summary  presentation by  a  review of how  . . 
these  arguments  appear  to  be  standing  u~ to public 
·scrutiny and  debate.  I  should  like to  conclude witt 
some  thoughts  on  this week's  Euronean  Council  in Brussels. 
I  The  seven .  .,. 
the  Comm~ni  ty' s  programme  for  Gtt a·inment  of  Aconumi c 
and monetary  union  are  a  combinatjon,  on  the  one  lwacl, 
of what  I  believe  are  new  arguments,  and,  on  the other, 
traclitiona.l  arguments,  the  combinCJtion,  contrary  to 
much  Ollinion,  being  stronger  in the  circumstances 
of the  late  1970s  than it was  at  the  beginning  or  the 
decade. 
The  first,  and  traditional argument  concerns  the 
rationalisation of trade  and  commerce,  which  comes  .. 
' 
with  a  customs  union.  The  latter is  a  great  achievement, 
but it is,  in my  view,  alwajs  undet  some  threat,  and  one 
which  could both  be  safeguarded.and  further  advanced 
if the  customs  union  became  also  a  monetary union.  The 
inter-nenetration of }!ember  States'  is  a  rcalitv;  more  than  h8lf 
of  each membsr  country's  exports  g6cs  to its  • 
;partners  in 'the  Community.  No  ~tcmber State  can  get 
away  from  these  facts,  or  hope  that markets  in third 
countries,  least  6£  all  in new  competitive  circum-
stances,  would  provide  a  substitute for  the  integrated 
economic  area provided  by  the  Community. 
The  second,  third  ~nd fourth  arguments  concern 
the traditional  objectives  of macioeconomic  policy  -
empl_oyment,  stab_ility and  a  sound  external  payments 
position.  These  objectives  are  traditional and  common 
to  the policies  of all }.fember  States.  But  there arc 
. two  new  aspects.  First there  is  the  extent to which 
Member  States  have  suffered  a  deteriorating  outcome 
in trying  to  combine  the  three objectives.  Second, 
there  is  the  extent  to which monetary union  accompanibd 
by policies  for  economic  integration offers itself as  1  one  of 1---..!--------- ----------
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one  of  tl1e  1::ajor  keys  to  sccurii1_t;,  in  the  long  run, 
a  basic  impruVClilcnt  in the  economic  cnvironmcr~t.  To 
these  central  argt1ments  I  will  return later. 
flonetnry  union would  also directly affect  our 
influence  on  \·JOrltJ  monetary  affairs,  Today  '\';c  hHvc 
not  got  a  proper world  monetary  systeli.  We  had  one 
for  25  years  after Bretton Woods,  and  on  the  whole  it 
'\vorkcd  very well.  Bu_t  it i·lC'!S  l.,ascd  on  a  complete 
dollar  hegemony.  It began to crack in  1968.  It 
fissured  in 1971.  Since  then it has  just staggered 
.. 
on.  And  today  the  dollar  looks  less satisfactory than 
ever  as  the  only  real  international. medium  of exchange 
that we  have.  Its continuous  weakness  can  be  a  great 
de-stabiliser.  The  Community  is  the world's  leading 
trading power  and  its second  economic  power,  and  the  formation 
of  a  monetary  union ivould  permit  the  Com~unity to play  a 
major  and  perhaps  decisive role  in the  restoration of 
order to  the  iniernationnl monetary  system.  It would 
also mean  that the  Commu.ni ty'  s  economy  as  a  whole 1·rould 
would  be  managed  under  less  severe  and  erratic externgl 
financial  constraints  than  at present. 
Economic  and  monetary union would  certainly 
not  remove  the need  for  disciplined efforts  throughout 
·the Member  States  to tackle  inflation;  on  the  contrary, 
it would  increase  them.  But  th§sb  ~£forts would  be 
recompensed  by  greater  rewards.  ~1onetary union ivould 
provide  an  opportunity  for  establishing a  fiew  standard 
of  European  price  stability.  Of  course,  such  a  new 
standard would still require  of  the  Community 
I  authorities - (;  -
to make  cut  of it a  continuing  era of  monetary 
stability.  But  some  !1<llt  of  the :nrcsent  problem  of 
inflafion  wo~ld in any  case  be  eliminated, ·notably 
the  transmission of inflationary impulses  due  to 
intra-Euronean  exchan(~c rate movements.  In  addition,  - .._  . 
the historic ~ct of  monetary  union.and  thereby monetary 
reform  could  introduce  a  decisive  break  in the  inflationary 
psychology of recent-years.-
.The  fourth  argument  concerns  employment.  Here 
I  believe that economic  and  monetary union  could  be  a 
decisive contribution to  the  nl'aj or Jle\'1  stimulus  now 
required  to  reveise  the  deen  recessionary  tendencies 
which  are  widely established  throughout  Europe  and  are 
manifestly of much  more  than cyclica,l _proportions.  A 
common  monetal.7 policy,  together with  a  significant 
degree  of cownon  budgetary action,  would  favour  a  more 
reliable,  sustainable  and  more  evenly  spread  growth 
of demand.  It would  be  less  inflationary  than  recent 
historical spurts  of  growth,  and  hence  give  a  further 
strenthening  to business .confidence  and  investment. 
The  fifth argument  concerns  th~ regional 
distribution of employ6ent  and  ecoriornic  welfare  in 
the  Community.  Experience  has  shmvn  that  the  int  c- . . 
gration process  contains  no  invisible hand  that 
. guarantees  an  even  spread of the  increased  economic 
prosperity that  the  customs  u~ion has  produced,  or  a 
... 
monetary  union would  further  generate.  The  economic 
nart  of  a  revised  approach  mu~t therefore be  strongly 
/directed - 7  -
clircctcJ  to1v2rds correctillg  the  Com;11uni ty' s  s1.n,;:.tur;Jl 
problems.  Anc1  this must  both  dea.l \dth sectoral  pro1:1er:s ~ 
for  exam.nle  in the  energy  field,  and  a  number  of major 
branches  of  industry,  and  with the  problem  of rcglonnJ 
im1J[tl~mcc.  This  will  require  a  sten~.1y bt,t  solid 
development  in  the  Community's  power  to direct  budgetary 
and  capital  market  resources  into  the  weaker  regions 
and  Member  States. 
~ty  sixth point  is constitutional  as  1·w 11  as 
economic.  It concerns  how  the  centralisation of  some 
macroeconomic  ~ewers inherent  in the .formation of  an 
economic  and  monetary union  can be  reconciled with  the 
profound  pressures  in all our Member  States 1avouring  a 
maintained or  increased decentralisation of  government. 
\ 
Monetary unionrdocs  not offer much  possibility for 
compromise  in the  sharing of responsibilities between 
the  levels  of  government.  On  the other hand,  the 
budgetary  and  economic  aspects  of union  offer very 
much  greater  scope  for  the  sharing  of responsibilities  • 
.·  . 
behTCen  the  Community  and  Hember  States.  The  Community 
must  look  for  an  original model  for  the  organisation 
of  economic  and  monetary  union  in which  the  Community 
would  take  on  the minimum  degree  of.centralisation adequate 
for  the task.  We  should  be  neither dismayed  nor 
constrained by  existing federal  ~ode~s. 
The  seventh  argument  1s  essentially  politic~l. 
Economic  and  monetary  union would  carry the  Community 
over  the  threshold  of nolitical union.  But  there 
/arc ---------·------------·- - 8  -
arc  also  h:o  shaTter-run pol.i  t icul  factors 
relevance:.  The  first is  the  que.sticn  of  en] Llrgc:::cn~. 
On  this  l  should  like~  to  add  one  noint  to  Hh:it.  I 
have  said already.  It  is not the  case that  an 
equnl ity of  pcrformanr.~c  is  a  pre-requisite  for  c;n 
effective monetary  union ..  Common  pollcy,  common  dis-
cinlines,  yes,  obviously yes.  But  not  the  saffic 
standorcls  of  living,  levels  of outnut  in  lbmb~lr£ 
and  Palermo,  or  in tnc  future  Copcnh~tgen and  Lisbon. 
Monetary  unions  have  ivorked  to the henefi ts  of  both 
richcr.ancl  poorer  areas  with  at  lc?st  equal 
discrepancies  in the  past.  They  do  indeed  work  within 
our  ~!ember  States  today Nhcre. t.hc  natura_!_  discrepancies 
are very great,  altho~gh greatly evened  un  by  fiscal 
transfers.  This distinction is vital.  If equality 
of performance  were  necessary,  it \·W~llcl  be  meaningless 
'  to  talk about  economic  and  monetary  uniorr for  our  life-
time  or  even  our children's  lifetime.  I  therefore  do 
not  regard  enlargement  as  a  bar  to  economic  and  monetary 
union,  but  rather  as  makfng  it essential. 
The  second political factor  is  the  campaign 
which will  take  place  for  the  first direct  elections 
to  the  European  Parliament ..  This  is  an  eminently 
suitable  occasion  for  the  people  of Europe  to  engage 
in  a  major  debate  on  the  profound  issues  which  economic 
and  monetary  union  both  senses  and,  in my  view,  helns 
to  resolve. 
I  present  these  arguments  in this  foreshortened 
way  as  a  backdrop  against '\rhich  I  shouJ d  1 ike  to discuss 
some  current  reactions  to  them.  I  shall  do  this .. 
\u:(1cr  three  headings  : 
- first,  institutional  question~; 
- second,  questions  of  econo:dc  argument; 
- third,  qucstion~of political attitude. 
On  institutional questions,  I  have  found  ~  clenr 
echo  of  opinion which  accepts  the proposition thot  we 
face  a  nroblem  of  the  level  at which  economic  and 
mvnctary !)Olicy  is organised  in relation to  international 
inves~ment, capital  and  the business  cycle;  put  another 
'"BY,  we  face  a  problem  in the  failure  Of  rmblic  !JOlicy  to 
be  adequately organised  in relation. to  the nrivRte 
economy.  This  view  is  not  as  pessimistic as  it may 
·  ·  economic 
sound.  It  implies  our  capacity for  a  better/pe:cfon;ancc 
in Western  Europe  has  not  been  fatally reduced,  and  that 
economic  thedry  and  policy are not  quitc~so badly  at 
sea  as  is  sometimes  suggested.  The  crucial  problem 
here  is that  small  and  medium  sized  Euronean  states using 
their  levers  of  monetar~ and  fiscal  policy  independently 
cannot  adequately  face  up  to the  international  dimcnsi'on 
of the  economic  phenomena  they are  trying  to  control. 
German  commentators  and  oninion  formers  arc 
uniquely well  placed  to participate  in this kind  of 
institutional analysis.  You  alone  among  Community 
countries  have  a  solid  groundin~ ln.the mechanism 
of  a  federal  system.  In  your  history you  have  cxperfcnced 
looser  confedcral  forms  of organisation  - riotably  in the 
middle  of the  last century.  Now  you  have  a  strong 
federal  structure,  one  that  is tighter  in its degree 
of central harmonisation  (for  example 'on  tax3tion matters) 
/than  jn --------··-~ -· -~··  ·-
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A(lm.i.t:tcdly  some  other  of our  !<ember  St~tcs nrc  no~; 
introducing  constitution~;.}.  rcfcnms  - and  I  am  thinkir::; 
here  of  Bc1glu;n,  Italy anJ.  the  United  J:ingdot~i.  But 
the  esscnti:Il point here  is that  you  in  Gcrnwny  C[lll 
c cmtemplatc  nr1·:·.urely  and opsn -J;dndcdly  the  1d.dc 
spectrum  of  an.·angc~men ts [or  muJ t i -tiered  govc'rn;,ie:nt 
th11L  may  be  co:ftlT'i'ttible  with  tho  functioninz  of  a 
modern,  industrialised  economy.  You  will,  I  ho~c, 
exau:ine  caTcfully  the  rather  special  basis  for  the 
devo  J OJ~incn  t  of  the  Comr:mn i ty 's  functions  that  I  am 
presenting,  and  indeed nut  to  the  European  Council 
th1s  week.  It is  one  in which--the  centralisation of 
monetary policy would  be  necessary but  in which  the 
distribution of fiscal  and  other financial  nowcrs 
would  be  a  very different matter.  I  suggest  in 
i 
particular  thdt  1ve  might  contc.mplatc  a  Co.mmunity 
intervening  only to  a  very minor  degree  in  the  supply 
of public  goods  and  services.  Community  public 
expenditure  as  a  share  ifr GNP  might  remain  no  more  than 
perhaps  a  fifth of that  seen  in the  average  modern  fede"ral 
state.  (This  would  be  intlusive of central social 
security transactions  - I  know  that  ~n Germany  you 
conventionally distinguish more  str6ngly between bt1dgetary 
and  social  security finances  than  in many  other  countries.) 
Two  other features  of the  Federal  Republic  today 
are  also  of relevance  :in  this context.  The  first  1s  a 
cap<:1ci ty  for  bold:  refonn  in the monetary  field.  In 
particular  I  recall  Ludwig  Erhard's  monetary  reform  of 
194 8,  when  he  ,.,rent  ahea.d  and  succeeded  only after  a 
/choru5  of --------------------------------------------
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:i_t  couJd  not  he.  ~:ionc!  The  second  feature"  is  th-_-. 
institution~d  ,w:~:ition  of the  centred  b:1HJ.~.  Here 
I  think  \v0  shmJlci  note  the  sj_r;;p1e  but  imprc:;s:i_vc 
foct  thu.t  :~he  t};:.-cc:  rtost  .S<JCC(':ssful  <!ncl  staiJLc 
and  also  k<ve  led  era}  o-:r  confcdcrnl  fcni:ls  of  gc>\'Cl ;m:e-i1 t. 
These  ore  good  reasons  why  Gerrtany  should  t.e  a 
major  source  of  intellectual  and  I  hone  110litical 
initiative in  the  construction of  E~rropc,  and  1>'11y 
others  in  the  Comnunity  should  J i.stf·n  to  your  argument~~ 
and  experience  very  carefully.  I  hope  our  ini.tiutivc 
in  relaunching  the  debate  on  monetary  union will 
\ 
stimulate  an  :hwginative  and  profcssiona~. contribution. 
Let  me  he  more  precise,  for  there  are  many  questions 
to  be  answered.  For  example,  how  far  could  a  relatively 
independent  European  monotary  authority delegate 
Operational  responsibilities  to  the  national  banks? 
Is  it effectively possible  to  devise  a  more  dccentralised 
monetary  and  banking  syste~ than that  found  in the 
United  St8tes,  which  is  already mor6  deccntralised than 
in the  Federal  Republit  ?  How  should  one  envisage  the 
evolution of the  Community's  monetary  and political 
development with  the  evolution of  it5  budgetary  power~? 
.These  can  he  of three  types 
tnm sf  cTs  <1 t tn ched  to  macroeconomic  co!lcl:i t ion:-;, 
clearly appropriate  in the  early stages  of  integration; 
I  -transfer~; - i  ..  - ·~··-·~ 
of  ~;r;c:cific  tas1:s  as  in  .: ll 
or  our  ReGional  or  Social  Fund~; 
- tr::r:sfcrs  devoted' to  budget  equ<tlisation  !"lil!'pc~c~ 
~:s  :i.n  your  'fin<JiiZausgleich'. 
l·rl  tl·c  COli''"t·.,,;i·v  ')f'  r·o··1'='J''  l·J,.._  l~·l'''1 1'ly  11''\''.,  ·t'n"'"J·r  J  ~-·•Ill  ~-..o..L  ...  -'  \..  ·'  •  \.I.e..)'  '"-""'l·  .  C<··  l.t.l  \_,  ...  '-' 
place  in  a  nwrc  matt1·1 c  pc•litical  structure. 
These  are  questions  that  I  kno'"  some  of you·· 
thought  decnly  about  in the  early  __ 1970s.  If  I  encourage 
you  now  tc  do  so  again,  it is because  I  helicve  thc1·e  arc 
powerful,  new  economic  arguments  pushing  us  in that 
direction.  The  consistent  Gcrmah thesis  - that monetary 
union  and  stability,  resource  transfer mechanisms,  and 
political  integration  - have  to  be  seen  as  an 
interdependent  and  indeed  indissoluble Hhole,  is, 
in  my  view,  right.  An  advance  on  any  one  front  alone 
cannot  succeed.  The  challenge  is  to  a~9ly our 
imaginations  in  a  constructive  and  practical way  so 
as  to make  measured  progress  on all three  fronts 
together. 
I  turn  from  institutional and  budgetary 
qudstions  to  those  of  economic  argument.  I  have 
argued  that  a  European  monetary  tinion,  buttressed  - . 
with  the  right  complementary  ~olicies, would  greatly 
improve  economic  welfare  in Europe  through  inducing 
more  lntens.ive  trade  and  commerce,  creating  a  more 
favourable  international monetary position,  through 
/reducing 
-.  ~  . ..  i ::; 
1 ·e.c.1;1.t~ .  .-J.1'.
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with pn::scnt  po 1 ic  ie~>  in achicv ing  the s c  o bj cct  ives,  not<:b ly 
in  their international  dimension,  c~n hardly be  doubted. 
S:i nee,  :1t  the  ~~m11c  time,  the  genuineness  of  effor_~_:;- in 
all  our  couTitrics  to  do  better by  conventional  means  cRnnot 
also  be  dou~c  (:c.~cl,  this  lt1Ctkes  the  need  to  look  to more 
,  •  1  r ::w. 1 c 0.  ~-
treatment  even  nore  compelling. 
\'that  thcrefoTc  seem~;  the  current  reaction  to  the 
economi.c  cc:;se  ?  On  the first  two  ~repositions, 
collcerning  t·1·~1dc  and  the  international  monetary 
sy5tc1n,  I  h~vc heard  no  real  disagre6rnent  :  the  benefits 
to  be  obtai.J:.cd  by  the  ~ommuni  ty  in  forming  a  full  moneto.ry 
union  are vast  - and  increasing when  we  give weight  to 
the vulncrabil:ity of  international  trade  and  the 
I 
relative weakness  of the  dollar.  Put  thc·other way 
round,  the  cost  ~f disunion  is  becoming  increasjngly 
obvious  and  heavy. 
There  has  been  more  hesitation  in  accepting  my 
argument  that  monetary  U11ion  would  offer  a  far  more 
favom:able  combination of  employment  and  price stability 
than  seems  achievable  in present  circumstances  by 
convention;:l  policies.  I  would  like therefore to 
elaborate  on  this.  There  are  two  arguments  here, 
one  negative  and  one  positive. 
The  nci•,nti ve  ,n·gument  consists  of  Tecogl!is:i.ng 
that it is  110  longer  true that  each  of  our !-1embcr  States 
has  to  accept  that  there  is  an  immutable  relationshin learned  C('llJV_ir  .  .:::i.ngly  th_,t  you  c:u~nt:>t  1my  LigL~~J· 
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and  a  Gcnrwn  audience  1·ri 11  confirii'l  this.  H1.1t  this 
is  not  an  objection nor  an  obstacle  to  setting out  to 
improve,  according  to  your  startin£ position,  either 
oT  hoth  the·  infJ nt:ion  and  unemployment  situation. 
The  Community  inflation and  crnployment  recnrJ  sJ1ould 
in no  wny  hc,cxpected  to  be  fixed  to  the wcightcJ 
average  per  formn.nce  of Hci:!bcr  States  over  some  recent 
ref  crcncc  l)CY ioct. 
If this  is  so,  what  then  of the nositivc 
onportuniti~s to  do  ~ettcir  ?  Her~  I  invite you  te 
reflect  for  a  mo~cnt on  the  situation in Eurone  today; 
to  rc Clcct  on  the  reasons  why  no  ~  .. fembcr  State  appcnrs 
able  to  move  more  quickly  rihcad  towards  our  shared 
objectives  for  employment  and  stability. 
. . 
I  I  .s t :1  y t 
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I  start with  the  Federal  Republic.  Germany  resists  -
at  least  in its extreme  form  - the  so-called  'locomotive  tl1cory' 
of cyclical  leadership  by  the  mo~c powerful  economies  whose 
balance of payments  position is strong.  It is current  among 
some  Anglo-Saxons,  but  I  understand  your  argument.  Virtually 
every  German  boom  since  the  war  has  been  led  in no  small 
measure  by  strong  export  demand,  leading  to  a  strong  con-
sequential  tide of private  investment.  German  industry is 
so  export-oriented that it is looking for  firmly  based  expansion 
of overall  demand  in its European markets.  You  can  take  the 
horse.to the water  but  y6u  cannot·makc  it drink.  To  extend  more 
expansionary fiscal  or monetary credits risks causing  the  trough 
to  flow  over with inflation.  Therefore  the attractiveness  of 
pulling further  on  the  levers  of. domestic  demand  management 
policy seems  limited.  You  cannot,  in the  conventional 
international setting,  have  an  impottant  effect  on  foreign 
' 
demand  without risk of  do~e~tic instability - but  the  situation 
within the setting of  a  European  union  could be  substantially 
different. 
Let  us  look  then  at 'the other medium  sized European 
economies.  Those  which,  f.rom  the point  of view  of monetary 
policy and  prices  are vulnerable·,  are  compelled  to  adont  a 
cautious  demand  management  policy ..  If they  do  not,  there  is 
the  risk that a  bolder  policy will result  in  a  sharp  drop  in 
the  exchange  rate with extremely.harmful  consequences  for 
domestic  inflation and  hence  business  confidence. 
The  smaller  countries  of the  Community,  for their part, 
share  the situations  of  one  or other  group  of the  larger countrie. 
except  that the  external  constraints  on  the  effects of any 
economic  nnlirv  mP::~~nr('~  th:1t  thPv  tn'kP  Nill  hA  P.vcn  Q'reatcr. - 16 
The  result. is  a  sort of  economic  stalemate.  The 
countries which  arc  under  no  external  financial  constraint arc 
nonetheless  reliant  on  the  weaker  countries  for  the  efective-
ness  of their policies.  But  the  more  vulnerable  countries 
are  themselves  unable  to  act  on  the basis  of the  collective 
economic  and  financial  strength of  the  Community  as  a  whole. 
This  is  a  recipe  not  only  for  immobility  and 
stagnation,  but  also  for  producing,iri:.hiblical  terms, 
not  "the wages  of sin" but  the  'wages  of  frustrated 
economic  expectations'.  The  contemp~~ary economic  bible 
surely demonstrates  that  the  wages  of frustrated  economic 
expectations  are  inflation and  social discontent,  circumstances 
in which it is  impossible  to  recreate business  confidence 
and  a  strong  business  upswing.  Community  interdependence 
in  trade,  finance,  exchange  rate  and price behaviour  is 
.· 
intense,  but  our  system of  inter-governmental  cooperation 
and  embryonic  Commu~ity instruments  demonstrably  do  not 
match  that  intensity:  what  other  conclusion can  be 
drawn  from  the  continuing  lament  in official statements 
-· 
from  each  of our  European  countries  that they  cannot  'on 
their  own'  assure  the  turn-round  in  international 
conditions  that  are  required  to  change  the  domestic 
economic  outlook? 
. . 
Some  would  here  argue  that  improv~d coordination 
should  be  the  full  answer.  The  Community  should,  of coutse, 
- play  a  full part :iri improving  its effectiveness,  but  let 
us  keep  a  sense  of perspective  as  to  its potential  - after 
all,  our efforts  to  coordinate  have  been  genuine  enough  fpr  a 
good  number  of years. 
/Tn  !I  nrlinPrlu 
-. 
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In  a  properly designated  European  monetary  union 
the  outlook  could,  I  believe,  be  radically different. 
The  res11lt  Wot1ld  be  single,  homo[;enous  monetary policy, 
setting,  and  indeed  maintaining,  a  common  high  standard 
of price stability.  It would  have  to  be  based  on  a 
well-prepared  currency  refo~m.  This  reform would  have 
produced  a  decisive  break  on  inflationary expectations, 
and  on  the  inflationar~  impul~cs  from  exchange  rate  changes 
within  Europe.  The  international monetary  constraint  on 
economic  policy would  also  have  been  removed  between 
. 
Member  States,  and  greatly diminished  as  regards  our 
monetary  relations  with  the  rest  of  the  world.  This 
would  be  a  new  economic  environment,  of stronger  internal 
monetary  disciplines,  but  more  relaxed  external  financial 
constraints.  To  work  it would  have  to  be  coupled  to  important 
Community  budgetary  and  financial  poweis,  better  , 
geographical  balance  in cyclical  conditions,  in  the 
structural  reconversion  of declining  industries,  and 
in  the  smoother  development  of  demand.  These  are  the 
conditions  in  which  we  would  have  a  right  to  expect 
business  and  labour  again  to  look  forward  to  a  sustainable 
and  broadly  based  economic  expansion.  I  do  not  believe 
this  view  of  the  future  is  either  unre~listically 
academic  nor  foolishly  utopian~ 
I  am  describing  the  technically achievable  reforms 
in  the  organisaion of monetary  and,  to  a  lesser but still 
important  degree,  fiscal  policy  that would  allow Europe's 
undoubted  potential  for  a  mo~e stable  and  employment-
creating  growth  to  be  released.  I  do  not  accept  that 
Europe's  potential  in  these  respects  has  been  irrevocably - 18  -
damaged  in  J'eccnt  years.  What  I  believe  is  th:.1t 
in  a  Europe  of  Gl  million unemployed,  and  in  a  Purope 
111  wtich  st~l1)ility  and  employment  are  not  so  much  compC::t.ing 
but  complementary  objectives,  we  should  not  be  hide-
bound  and  confined  hy  the  assumptions  and  conventions 
of  the  past,  but  ready  to  contemnlate  institutional 
reforms. 
There  remain  those  who  say that  CID!lloyment 
problems  are  a  matter  of political urgency,  but  su~h 
proposals  are  addressed to  anothei~  longer  time 
horizon.  But  there  are  thre~ reDlies  to  such  a 
criticism. 
First,  our  employment  problem is,  I  am  afraid,  now 
\ 
a  medium  tcrm,rather  than  an  ordinary cyclical matter. 
r-!oreover,  beyond  the  61  million unemployed  of today 
there  are  9  million more  young  people  who  between  n6w 
and  1985  are  going  to  be  added  to  the  Community  labour 
force  looking  for  new  extra jobs;  and  the  Federal 
Rcr>ublic  is,  because  of its population profile,  at  the 
ton  of this list.  Thus  we.have  to  think  in terms  of 
a  new  medium-term  stimulus  for  the  European  economy  -
a  stimulus which will  have  fa  be  of .some  historic 
dimension  to meet  the  extent  of our  present  and 
prospective  employment  problem. 
- Second,  while  monetRry  union  is clearly not  for  the 
very  short-run,  I  would  not  wish  to push it over  the 
horizon.  We  should  be  prepared to  take preparatory 
decisions  and  proceed  as  fast  as  those  who  want  to 
succeed  together  and  be  convinced  of  the  arguments.  To 
.  . - 19  -
If a  new  design  for  the  Co~nunity's monetary  union  and 
economic  integration  gains  support  in the  debate  that  we  are 
now  initiating  - in all the  Community's  institutions  and  in 
the  public  at  large  - than  we  should  look  very  seriously 
again at  the  length  of the  time-horizon. 
- Third,  and  for  the  short  run,  I  would  by  no  means 
underestimate  the  favourable  effect  on  business  confidence  in 
Europe  of  the  Community  deciding  to  embrirk  again seriously  on 
a  renewed  and  intensified approach  to  economic  and  monetary 
union.  Our  European  Council  earlier this  week  was  in this 
respect  encouraging  - although  nqt  in itself decisive.  These 
are  early  days  still,  and  much  more  remains  for  next  year,  but  we 
have  achieved  a  'fair wind'  for  our  new  approach.  But 
this  European  Council  also  broke  through  some  log-jams. 
It agreed  in principle  to  a  new  Community  l~an mechanism; 
it resolved certain budgetary  problems  thus  opening 
the  way  for  the  ne~ unit  of  account  and  own  resources  in 
the  1978  budget;  strengthered our  short  and  medium-term  balance 
of payments  mechanisms,  supported  the  build-up  of  Communi~y 
industrial policies ,and looked forward  to  new  proposals  on 
youth  employment.  This  is  a ·considerable  list of 
practical achievements  and  they are all useful  steps  towards 
building  up  the  sinews  of  an  integrated  economy.  If we  can 
succeed  in  presenting  in  the  next  year  a  convincing  and well-
understood plan  of action  - relati~i today's  steps with 
tomorrow's  design  - that  in itself should  substantjally  improve 
the  general  morale  of  the  Conmunity,  of  worker~, managers  and 
investors,  of industry and  of  governments. 
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I  hope  that  German  opinion will  join in this 
new  revi~al of  an  old  debate with  vigour.  In  terms 
of  economic  policy,  you  may  be  reluctent  to  embrace 
the  so-called  'locomotive  the6ry'  for  international 
economic  coordination;  some  of you  may  now  even 
be  hesitant  about  a  strong  nmv  Community  initiative. 
I  understand  both these  attitudes.  But  in the  final 
analysis,  I  believe  that  German  interesis  cannot  be 
well  served  by resisting both  propos~ls at  the  same 
time.- My  inclination would  certainly be  to  support 
international:_ economic  cooperation but  to  give  primary 
support  to  the construction.qf a  hard-core  integrated 
Community  economy  along  the  lines· I  have  tried to 
describe.  I  am  enco~raged that  the  way  is  now 
open  in the  Community  institutions to  take  up  the 
central  que~tions afresh.  It is  thanks  in  no  small 
measure  to  the helpful position taken  up  by  this 
week's  European  Council.  I  hone  for  a  vital con-
tribution from  the  Federal  Renublic  as  a  whole.  Your  .  -
strength as  a  greatly  re~pected industrialised and 
democratic  society inevitably gives  you  both 
opportunity  and  responsibility in the construction of 
Europe. 
I  should  like to  conclude with  a  general political 
reflection.  It has  recently  be~n·~aid fhat  Europe 
cannot  be  united  by money  alone.  Indeed  this was  tfie 
published  view  of Herr  Apel  on  2nd  Dccembct.  I  agree 
with  him.  I  also  agree  with  him  that  there  is  no 
alternati~e to  European  integration.  But  I  also 
believe that there  can  be  no  such  full  integration 
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platform  from  whicl1  \\'e  launch this  debate  is  a  bronc1ly 
based  one  - it is monetary,  of  course;  it is alsa 
Cle~rly economic;  but  it is also political  and 
institutional;  we  must  fashion  our policies,  short 
term  and  medium  term,  wj_th  the  firm  purnose  of  further 
Community  integration,  ~ade more  than  ever  necessary 
by  the  prospect  of enlargement. 
This  requires- for  both  s·trong  and  ~~cak  a  combination 
of benefits  and  sacrifices,  certainly not  all  from  one 
side,  certainly not  all to  the  other.  But  it requires 
above  all  a  realisation that  the  Community  creates  and 
docs  not  merely redistribute.  It has  not  been  and  must 
not  be  thought  of  as just taking  from  one  and  giving  to 
another.  It must  benefit  us  all,  strong  as  well  as  weak; 
otherv,rise  it will never  move  decisively  fon<lard.  And  it  , 
must  always  remember  its political purpose,  inspiration 
and  goals,  even·though its means  must  be  largely 
economic. 